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LYOTARD AND THE CHRISTIAN METANARRATIVE:
A REJOINDER TO SMITH AND WESTPHAL
Justin Thacker

Recently, James Smith and Merold Westphal have sought to reconcile
Christianity with Lyotard’s definition of the postmodern – “incredulity
towards metanarratives” – by claiming that Christianity is not a metanarrative in Lyotard’s sense. This paper argues that their understanding of the
Lyotardian metanarrative is too restrictive, and that the term specifically
includes Christianity within its scope. Despite this, though, there is a means
by which Christianity and Lyotard can be brought closer together. That
method is to understand Lyotard’s refusal of metanarratives as being to
some extent provisional. Combining this idea with Lyotard’s notion of the
differend allows Christianity and Lyotardian postmodernism to be found, if
not in agreement, at least to coexist.

I. Introduction
“En simplifiant à l’extrême, on tient pour postmoderne l’incrédulité à l’égard
des métarécits.”1
“Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity towards
metanarratives.”2
In any attempted rapprochement between Christianity and Lyotard’s definition of the postmodern, Christian theologians and philosophers have
tended to take one of two paths. In the first place, there are those who have
focussed on the reason behind Lyotard’s incredulity, asking the question:
“What is it about metanarratives that engenders his scepticism?” So, for
instance, Richard Middleton and Brian Walsh have seen in Lyotard’s definition a suspicion of the totalising and oppressive character of metanarratives, and in response have sought to argue that Christianity is not that
kind of story.3 James Smith4 and Merold Westphal5 have trodden the second, and less common, path in two recent papers. Here the focus is on
what constitutes a metanarrative, and the argument is made that in
Lyotard’s terms, Christianity does not qualify. The purpose of this paper is
to criticize the solutions proffered by Smith and Westphal, arguing that
Christianity represents a perfect example of a metanarrative. Despite this,
though, I will point towards a third way in which at least a détente may be
made between Lyotard’s thesis and Christianity. That third way will centre
on a thorough examination of Lyotard’s own thought. Such an exploration
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will reveal both the provisionality of his refusal of metanarratives and his
acceptance of narrative conflict. Together these factors provide conceptual
space for Christianity and Lyotard to be found sitting, if not in agreement,
at least in the same room.
II. Smith’s Reason
Smith begins his paper by offering a criticism of what he terms “a common
misreading of Lyotard.”6 He points towards Middleton and Walsh, chastising them for their ethical interpretation of metanarratives.7 Similarly,
Stanley Grenz does not escape censure for, according to Smith,8 focussing
on the scope of metanarratives rather than their nature. In all of this, Smith
repeatedly suggests that these authors’ misunderstandings arise from a
failure to pay sufficient attention to Lyotard’s text.9 What Smith will therefore offer in response is a “closer reading”,10 a reading that I now wish to
examine. For it is my contention that in a number of ways Smith has himself misunderstood or ignored the text that he is claiming to scrutinise so
carefully.
Smith starts by correctly unpacking the linguistic background to
Lyotard’s analysis, noting specifically Lyotard’s description of sender, referent and addressee in any communicative action. The implication of this
triad is that for communication to take place successfully, these elements
must operate within a shared set of rules, rules that legitimate the type of
discourse that takes place. This issue of legitimation then becomes central
for both Lyotard and Smith, and, in this respect, Smith notes Lyotard’s distinction between narrative knowledge and scientific knowledge. The former legitimates itself simply by being told. The latter, however, defines
itself as requiring some form of external legitimation, in that science
requires proof. It is at this point, though, that Smith begins to misunderstand Lyotard. He claims in at least four different places that science looks
for this legitimation in a narrative grounded in universal reason. In addition, he suggests that this move is what defines or engenders a metanarrative for Lyotard. “For Lyotard, metanarratives are a distinctly modern phenomenon: they are stories which not only tell a grand story…, but also
claim to be able to legitimate the story and its claims by an appeal to universal
Reason.”11 It is this dual assertion – that modern scientific knowledge legitimates itself by a narrative of universal reason, and that this is what
Lyotard means by a metanarrative – that I wish to contest. However, it is
important to note here that what I am contesting is what Lyotard has said,
not what actually may be the case. It may well be that modern scientific
knowledge does legitimate itself with such an appeal, but that is not what
Lyotard argues in The Postmodern Condition.
The first indication that Smith may have gone wrong is that his interpretation is unusual amongst the scholarly community. If one examines particularly the secular philosophers, there is a significant degree of unanimity
on what Lyotard means by a metanarrative, and it is certainly not a legitimating narrative based on universal reason. So, Bill Readings describes the
grand narrative as “the story that can reveal the meaning of all stories…Its
metanarrative status comes from the fact that it talks about the many nar-
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ratives of culture so as to reveal the singular truth inherent in them.”12
Similarly, Gary Browning quotes with approval Nancy Fraser and Linda
Nicholson’s description thus: “In his (Lyotard’s) conception of legitimating
metanarrative, the stress properly belongs on the ‘meta’ and not the ‘narrative’. It purports to be a privileged discourse capable of situating, characterizing and evaluating all other discourses.”13 And, in a similar fashion,
Emilia Steuerman describes the grand narrative, at least in The Postmodern
Condition, as a “totalizing unity” that “grounds all other narratives.”14 What
all these authors are getting at is that the metanarrative is a universal, legitimating narrative that seeks to ground, explain, reveal or otherwise control
all other narratives. Now, of course, narratives based on universal reason
may well fulfil this function. Lyotard himself points to the Enlightenment
narrative as such an example. However, as Lyotard makes clear, this is but
one case amongst many.15 So a metanarrative includes Smith’s description
but is not limited to it.
The second reason to doubt Smith’s thesis is that, despite its originality,
Smith fails to provide the necessary support for it. On at least four occasions,
he reasserts his claim that a metanarrative is a legitimating narrative based
on universal reason.16 However, at none of these points is Lyotard’s work
referred to. Indeed, the only place I am aware of where Lyotard does suggest
that a metanarrative might be based on universal reason is in a letter published in the collection The Postmodern Explained to Children, where he states,
“The appeal to modern ideals was an appeal to the universality of reason.”17
This seems to me the best evidence Smith has for his thesis, though he does
not cite it. Yet, even here, there are problems, not least that the letter is not
dealing with the issue of metanarratives. And when Lyotard refers to “modern ideals” the context of the passage indicates that he is talking specifically
about Enlightenment ideals, and not about ideals more generally. As I have
already said, the Enlightenment metanarrative certainly does fit Smith’s
description, but that is only one metanarrative amongst many and, as we
will see later, not even the most important one for Lyotard.
The third reason to doubt Smith is to note that, for Lyotard, metanarratives draw their legitimation not from their arche but from their telos.
Lyotard states, “[Metanarratives] look for legitimacy not in an original
founding act but in a future to be accomplished, that is, in an Idea to be
realised.”18 And similarly, he describes the “great narrative” as that “which
promises at the end to reconcile the subject with itself.”19 The nature of that
end is pluriform, but the point Lyotard is making is that what constitutes a
metanarrative is the promise of such an end, not the origin or grounding
ideology. Furthermore, in The Postmodern Explained to Children, Lyotard
clarifies what he terms “the ‘metanarratives’ I was concerned with in The
Postmodern Condition.” Amongst others, there is “the salvation of creatures
through the conversion of souls to the Christian narrative of martyred
love.”20 The important point here is that Lyotard says nothing about
grounding narratives upon universal reason, but he does point to
Christianity as centered upon a “narrative of martyred love”21 or elsewhere
“hope.”22 Similarly, as well as noting the Enlightenment narrative, Lyotard
also points to Romanticism23 and an emancipatory narrative24 as examples
of such metanarratives, which in both cases he specifically makes clear are
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not based on universal reason (see endnotes). The point of these examples
– Christianity, Romanticism and emancipation – is to demonstrate that,
according to Lyotard, examples can be given of metanarratives that are not
grounded upon universal reason. This point is strengthened when one
realises that in different places Lyotard uses two of these examples as paradigm cases for what a metanarrative looks like.25
All of my arguments so far could be considered mere proof texting, and
therefore in this section of the paper I will outline the structure of Lyotard’s
argument in The Postmodern Condition. Having set the stage in chapters 1-5,
Lyotard spells out in chapters 6 and 7 the respective natures of narrative
knowledge and then scientific knowledge. Smith accurately comments
upon this part of Lyotard’s work. Then, at the end of chapter 7 and the start
of chapter 8 Lyotard specifies the problem scientific knowledge has: “the
demand for legitimation.”26 It is in response to this “demand” that Smith
misunderstands Lyotard. He is of the opinion that such a demand is
answered by an appeal to universal reason, but nowhere in chapters 8 or 9,
where Lyotard lays out the answer, is universal reason per se mentioned. In
chapter 8, Lyotard points to a whole series of narratives that have been used
across time to legitimate scientific knowledge. He mentions Plato’s dialogues, Descartes’ cogito and Aristotle’s metaphysics amongst others.27 Then,
in the recent modern period, he notes that the legitimation of science takes
on some new nuances. These include an approval of narrative as a source of
legitimation and, especially, a referral to “the people (the nation, or even
humanity)” as the ultimate legitimator.28 Even if one reads into these various narratives of legitimation an appeal to universal reason, it is immediately clear that such an appeal is not Lyotard’s main concern, for the simple
reason that he never mentions it. In fact the only unifying factor that
Lyotard points to in all these narratives is just that – that they are only narratives. This point Smith acknowledges, but to assert that they are all based
on universal reason is to read into the text something that is not there.
In the following chapter, Lyotard describes two paradigm examples of
narratives of legitimation for scientific knowledge. The first of these is
termed a “narrative of speculation” and the second a “narrative of emancipation.” The important point to remember in this is that Lyotard specifically selects these two narratives as quintessential examples of what he considers metanarratives to be. In the first example, there possibly is room for
Smith’s thesis. Essentially, Lyotard is referring to Hegel’s corpus as a narrative that legitimates scientific knowledge. He even goes so far as to
describe it as “a rational narration, or rather metanarration”29 and, in that
way, Smith’s contention may seem evident. Having said that, it certainly
does not seem that this is the focus of Lyotard’s attention. Most of his discussion on this speculative narrative is on its self-grounding, totalising
nature rather than on any appeal to universal reason.
In the second narrative – the narrative of emancipation – any idea of
universal reason is entirely absent. This narrative is one in which the
people or humanity free themselves from the oppressors who would
seek to deny them knowledge. “If the social subject is not already the
subject of scientific knowledge, it is because that has been forbidden by
priests and tyrants. The right to science must be reconquered.” 30
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Furthermore, Lyotard makes it clear that the motivation behind this narrative does not have to do with knowledge itself, but simply freedom.
“The principle of the movement animating the people is not the selflegitimation of knowledge, but the self-grounding of freedom or, if preferred, its self-management.”31 The only role of knowledge in such a narrative is as a tool that the people use as and when they dictate.
“Knowledge has no final legitimacy outside of serving the goals envisioned by the practical subject, the autonomous collectivity.”32 It is, of
course, possible to argue that such a narrative of emancipation is itself
predicated upon a higher narrative (a meta-metanarrative) that does
appeal to universal reason, e.g. Marx’s dialectical materialism. However,
Lyotard does not leave this option open. He tells us that Marxism represents both of these narratives, “the proletariat that of the people or of
humanity, dialectical materialism that of speculative idealism.” 33
Lyotard’s point seems specifically to be that the narrative of emancipation only has the people or humanity as its grounding ideology. It does
not consist in an appeal to reason, and where one does introduce an
appeal to reason, as in dialectical materialism, even if that reason is to
ground such a narrative of emancipation, then because of that very fact
it is a narrative of speculation, not one of emancipation.
Let me return then to how Lyotard introduces these two examples.
He gives them as paradigms of what a metanarrative might look like.
He calls them “major versions of the narrative of legitimation.” 34
However, Lyotard’s point is not to exhaust the category of metanarrative by them, but to demonstrate what it may look like. He states, “The
grand narrative has lost its credibility, regardless of what mode of unification it uses, regardless of whether it is a speculative narrative or a
narrative of emancipation.”35 It seems that in this very sentence we have
a direct contradiction of Smith’s thesis that it is the nature of metanarratives that is important to Lyotard. He is incredulous towards metanarratives “regardless of what mode of unification” they use, that is
regardless of what kind of metanarrative they are, regardless of their
nature. I am not sure how any other interpretation here is possible. In
addition, Lyotard, by presenting a narrative that has nothing do with
universal reason as one of his paradigm examples, casts significant
doubt on Smith’s suggestion that a metanarrative is, by definition,
based on an appeal to universal reason. It can hardly be that if
Lyotard’s own prime example is not.
In summary, therefore, Smith’s thesis that what Lyotard means by metanarratives are narratives that appeal to universal reason is fallacious.
Lyotard does not suggest this, it conflicts with Lyotard’s emphasis on a
narrative’s telos rather than arche, and Lyotard gives numerous examples
of metanarratives that are specifically not grounded upon reason.
Furthermore, in the four crucial chapters in The Postmodern Condition, metanarratives, whilst including those based on reason, are not limited by that
description. Indeed, when Lyotard gives his two paradigm examples of
metanarratives, he either disavows or ignores reason as a factor. Finally, it
is perhaps for all these reasons that Smith’s suggestion is less common
amongst the scholarly community.
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III. Westphal’s Autonomy

Westphal offers a more accurate discussion of Lyotard in his recent paper36
He describes three defining features of a metanarrative that simultaneously demonstrate why Christianity is not a metanarrative in Lyotard’s sense.37
The first is that “A metanarrative is a metadiscourse in the sense of being a
second-level discourse not directly about the world but about a first-level
discourse.”38 The second point that Westphal makes is that metanarratives
are primarily narratives of legitimation. They seek to legitimate the primary discourses that they govern, whatever the nature of those primary discourses.39 All of this I would agree with as an exposition of Lyotard.
However, it is on Westphal’s third point that problems arise. In describing
this final distinguishing mark that both defines the metanarrative and distinguishes it from Christianity, he looks to the provenance of both. “The
third and final difference…concerns origins. [Christianity] has its origin in
revelation, not in philosophy, and most especially not in modern philosophy, grounded in the autonomy of the human subject.”40
There are three main reasons why this assertion cannot be upheld. The
first of these is that Lyotard stresses again and again that concerning metanarratives it is not the origin of a narrative that matters, but its telos. I have
already quoted (see above) two sections where Lyotard makes this point,
but here is another. In a discussion in which he lists four points that distinguish the postmodern fable from the grand narrative, the third marker is
an absence of “eschatology.”41 He states, “The end of this history is in no
way directed toward the horizon of an emancipation.” 42 Elsewhere,
Lyotard comments on this one uniting factor of all the “great narratives” of
the last two hundred years: “they all situate the data supplied by events
within the course of a history whose end, even if it is out of reach, is called
freedom.”43
Westphal’s description of the grounding of metanarratives provides us
with the second reason to doubt his thesis. To begin with, it seems that
Westphal’s statement, “[Christianity] has its origin in revelation, not in philosophy,” is surely begging the question. For Lyotard, all narratives have
their origin in the human subject. The whole point of chapters 3 and 5 of
The Postmodern Condition is to affirm that we are all linguistically conditioned, we cannot step out of our own linguistic context, whether that is to
seize “reality” or “revelation”. Westphal, of course, would agree with this.
More than most, he has served Christianity well by reminding the church
of her finitude. Hence, on both his and Lyotard’s terms, it is not just that
cultural conditioning affects our appropriation of revelation, but more than
that, the very statement “[Christianity] has its origin in revelation” is so
conditioned, and therefore just as much part of philosophy (in a broad
sense) as anything else. Hence, to try to claim that because Christianity’s
roots are in revelation it can somehow escape the critique of philosophy is
surely to beg the question. How do you know the origins of Christianity
are such? You cannot, in any absolute sense. Therefore, Westphal’s attempt
to shield Christianity from the critique of philosophy stumbles before it
even gets started.44
More plausible is Westphal’s suggestion that Christianity does not find
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its origin “in modern philosophy, grounded in the autonomy of the human
subject.” However, even this suggestion, on Lyotardian terms, is questionable. The important issue here is whether “the autonomy of the human
subject” represents the sine qua non of metanarratives for Lyotard. Echoing
the form of my argument with Smith, I would certainly agree that where
one has a philosophy grounded in this way, it probably represents a metanarrative for Lyotard. The issue is whether this exhausts what Lyotard
would consider to be metanarratives, and whether it is the primary issue
for him in his definition of metanarratives. On the first of these points, an
examination of Lyotard’s attitude to Emmanuel Levinas will prove useful.
For if anyone has written a philosophy based on the heteronomy of the
human subject, it is Levinas. Therefore, if Lyotard embraces Levinas’
scheme, we can safely conclude he does not consider it as one of those
metanarratives to which he is incredulous. However, despite in many
ways applauding Levinas, and drawing some of his own thought from
him, it is precisely on this point that Lyotard begins to distance himself
from him. In Just Gaming, Lyotard indicates that the difference between
himself and Levinas is that while he considers Levinas’ discourse as merely useful, Levinas considers it the “truth.”45 Lyotard then goes on to highlight what he considers as the danger of such an attitude: it tends to privilege or legitimate one discourse above all others.46 Furthermore, Lyotard
gives an indication of why Levinas may end up in this position. Although
he is trying to write a phenomenological ethics regarding our responsibility towards the Other, Levinas is not able to write about this without at the
same time being ensnared by what Lyotard terms a “denotative metalanguage”.47 What Lyotard seems to be suggesting here is that, although he
welcomes the essence of Levinas’ discourse, he cannot accept the manner
in which Levinas delineates it. His particular problem is if a discourse
claims to apprehend the “truth,” because it describes things as they really
are, which is what Lyotard’s “denotative metalanguage” alludes to.48 This
whole paradigm (denotative metadiscourse that apprehends reality and
thereby legitimates other primary discourses) represents the language of
metanarratives. Hence, although Lyotard nowhere describes Levinas’ discourse as a metanarrative, he distances himself from it precisely on the
same points that he distances himself from more typical metanarratives.
The relevance of this is that it suggests that whether a narrative finds its
locus in the autonomy or heteronomy of the subject, or indeed anything
else about the content of a narrative, is not the important point for Lyotard.
The significant factor for him seems to be much more general than this,
related to the manner in which a narrative is described and held. And if
this is right, then Westphal’s suggestion that the “the autonomy of the
human subject” is a defining feature of metanarratives cannot be upheld.
Finally, Westphal states bluntly, “Christianity is not Lyotard’s target.”49
Once again, it should be clear by now that Christianity is precisely one of
Lyotard’s targets. I have quoted earlier Lyotard’s clarification in The
Postmodern Explained to Children where he specifically lists Christianity
amongst his objects. Similarly, elsewhere, Lyotard lists what he considers
to be the “great narratives” of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Not
surprisingly, we find here the Enlightenment narrative, the Marxist narra-
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tive, the Hegelian narrative and the capitalist narrative. However, what
takes pride of place as the first narrative listed is “a Christian narrative in
which Adam’s sin is redeemed through love.”50 Of course, it would be possible for Westphal to argue that he has correctly described metanarratives,
and that Lyotard is opposed to Christianity because he has misunderstood
the nature of Christianity. The problem with this argument is that the features of Christianity that Lyotard points to – “a narrative of martyred love”
and redemption through “love” - are hardly features with which Westphal
would disagree. Furthermore, they are not features that Westphal’s definition of metanarratives indicates. The simpler explanation is that Westphal’s
definition is inaccurate.
Hence, albeit in a less egregious way than Smith, even Westphal’s
description of metanarratives as those grounded in “the autonomy of the
human subject” seems too restrictive. As he points out, Christianity is not
grounded in such autonomy, yet Lyotard still considers it a metanarrative.
So what are the defining features of a metanarrative for Lyotard and why
is he incredulous towards them?
IV. Lyotard’s Definition
It seems clear from Lyotard’s own writing that there are three essential features to a metanarrative – essentially the three features that the scholarly
community (Smith and Westphal excepted) has reached a consensus on
(see discussion earlier). These features are 1) a second-level narrative about
a primary discourse; 2) a legitimating discourse, that in some sense controls, explains or grounds other discourses; 3) a universal discourse that
legitimates in this way all other discourses.51 These points are not particularly contentious. The essence of my disagreement with Smith and
Westphal is that they have added a fourth feature – grounded in universal
reason and grounded in the autonomy of the human subject, respectively –
that is unjustified on the basis of Lyotard’s writings, and which inappropriately limits metanarratives in a way that Lyotard did not intend.
If I am right about this description of what Lyotard means by a metanarrative, the immediate question is why is he incredulous towards them?
For if we examine his work, it becomes apparent that a certain degree of
inconsistency is evident. Let us ask first whether Lyotard is incredulous
simply because these narratives are second-level discourses. This seems
almost certainly not the case, for the reason that at numerous points
Lyotard himself advocates such meta-discourses with no sense of either
embarrassment or irony.52 Furthermore, in some way all discourses are about
other discourses and therefore meta in level. Secondly, is he incredulous
because they are legitimating discourses, which by definition also include
the idea that they are second-level discourses? At first sight, this may seem
to be the case. However, taken alone, it cannot be, for, in The Postmodern
Condition, there comes a curious section where Lyotard not only tolerates
second-level legitimating discourses, he positively encourages them. The relevant section comes in the final chapter of that book, where Lyotard is discussing how we might act in a way that is just, given the plurality of language games that exist. He is against finding a rule of consensus (as per
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Habermas), and therefore he suggests instead two particular moves. The
first of these is to recognise the inherent “heteromorphous nature of language games” and not try to suppress it. The second is to make the rules
that govern language games “local” and “finite”, that is “subject to eventual cancellation.” But the upshot of this move is to encourage “a multiplicity
of finite meta-arguments, by which I mean argumentation that concerns
metaprescriptives and is limited in space and time.”53 What Lyotard is
arguing for here is the presence of multiple, restricted, second-level legitimating discourses, for that is exactly what the rules of a language game
represent.54 Hence, the presence of such a discourse alone is not what
makes Lyotard incredulous. Is it then Lyotard’s final factor, the universal,
that is the source of his incredulity? Once again it cannot be universality
per se that is the problem, given Lyotard’s own lack of reticence when he
writes in a universal way. (For instance, when he writes about language
games as such, and without any further qualification.) A number of combinations are possible, but what is most likely is that what makes Lyotard
incredulous is not any one of these three factors alone, but their combination in a single discourse. That is, Lyotard is incredulous towards narratives that are second-level and legitimating and universal. This certainly
seems to be what Lyotard is getting at when in his explanation of metanarratives he states that they represent an Idea which “has legitimating value
because it is universal. It guides every human reality.”55
However, the question remains: what is it about the combination of
these three factors in a metanarrative that makes Lyotard incredulous? The
answer to this question is found in the final chapter of Just Gaming, a book
published in the same year as The Postmodern Condition. In that work JeanFrançois Lyotard and Jean-Loup Thébaud have a discussion, arranged
over seven days,56 that examines the question of how justice is possible. In
the final chapter of the book, entitled “Majority does not mean great number but great fear,” the outlines of a conclusion are drawn, a conclusion
that is explicated in more depth in The Differend. That conclusion centres on
the fact that an injustice occurs whenever any particular language game
oversteps its proper boundary and begins to intrude on another. This clearly happens whenever a language game makes pretensions to universality,
so Lyotard writes, “any attempt to state the law, for example, to place oneself in the position of the enunciator of the universal prescription is obviously infatuation itself and absolute injustice, in point of fact.”57 Not only is
such a pretension the characteristic of injustice, it is also necessarily a fiction. “[It is] impossible for anyone to establish her- or himself in a field and
proceed to produce its laws in a sort of universal language or generalized
metalanguage, and then go on to extend these laws to all the fields of language.”58 As will be clear, this is the language of metanarratives – universal, second-level, legitimating discourses – and Lyotard’s incredulity
towards them appears to centre on two poles. The first is that such narratives are unjust, due to their oppression and silencing of other narratives,
and, secondly, that they are implausible. These two poles represent respectively a suspicion and scepticism towards metanarratives, which is indeed
what the French term “incrédulité” indicates, having as it does a slightly
broader semantic range than the English “incredulity.” However, that is
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not all that needs to be said. For if the factor driving this incredulity is
merely any language game overstepping its bounds, then we should
expect to find that Lyotard is incredulous even if the narrative does not
make universal pretensions, but simply seeks to adjudicate on other narratives that are not properly part of its scope. And this is exactly what we
find in Just Gaming. “Here one would have to ask whether a language
game that becomes excessive…that is, precisely when such a language
game begins to regulate language games that are not the same as itself,
isn’t such a language game always assisted by the sword?”59 Lyotard goes
on to spell out what this means: “Majority does not mean large number, it
means great fear.” This is a hugely significant statement, which explains its
use as the title of this final chapter of Just Gaming. Lyotard’s point is that
what troubles him about metanarratives is the way in which they overstep
their bounds, and begin to control or manipulate other narratives.
Furthermore, he adopts this attitude irrespective of the content of the metanarrative involved. Another way of saying this is that all narratives must
be local and finite and should claim nothing beyond themselves. The
whole point of Lyotard’s subsequent major work, The Differend, is to outline how we might then act given the inevitable contradictions and conflicts that will arise as a result of this idea.
V. Christianity
Now that we have established what Lyotard means by a metanarrative,
and, more importantly, why he is incredulous towards them, we are in a
position to situate Christianity within his framework. It should, of course,
be immediately obvious that Christianity must be such a metanarrative, for
almost any claim it makes will, for Lyotard, impinge upon the claims of
other narratives. For Christians to claim that God exists, impinges upon the
atheistic narratives; for Christians to claim Jesus died on a cross, impinges
upon the Quranic narrative, and so on. Indeed, any narrative held with
anything more than merely local intent has the feature of a metanarrative
that makes Lyotard incredulous. It is not surprising, therefore, that
throughout his writings, we do (contra Westphal) find Lyotard precisely
describing Christianity as the kind of metanarrative that he is incredulous
towards. Does this mean then that no rapprochement between Lyotard
and Christianity is possible? To put it in his terms, can we do nothing but
bear witness to this differend,60 without seeking a solution? Do we indeed
have to claim that Paris has nothing to do with Jerusalem?
I do not think we have to despair or give up any hope of an appropriate
appropriation, but the solution to this problem is not to be found where
Smith and Westphal have placed it, but rather, paradoxically enough, in a
closer examination of Lyotard’s own thought. The point of Just Gaming has
been to examine whether justice is possible without resorting to the socalled justice of metanarratives or universal prescriptions. Lyotard seems
ambivalent on whether such a justice is indeed possible, yet he does not
want to leave the situation there. For, as he sees it, to do so would be to
leave us open to “indifferentism, that is the bad side of the pagan line I am
trying to trace.”61 Hence, almost despite himself, Lyotard ends the book
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with this remarkable imperative: “And then the justice of multiplicity: it is
assured, paradoxically enough, by a prescriptive of universal value.” In
light of this, it is no surprise that the final line is given to Jean-Loup
Thébaud: “Here you are talking like the great prescriber himself…(laughter).”62 The question in all of this is how can Lyotard, who has spent the
whole book railing against universal prescriptives, end by asserting one
himself? Lyotard does not particularly pursue this question other than in
the ironic laughter that accompanies the close of the book. Indeed, a number of authors, not least Samuel Weber who provides an afterword to Just
Gaming, point to this facet of Lyotard’s thought, and accuse him of inconsistency and self-contradiction.63Having said this, there is a quotation at the
start of Just Gaming that may provide an insight into what Lyotard is doing
here. That quotation, from Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, runs like this:
“The rule of the undetermined is itself undetermined.” In using this quotation at the start, and by ending the book with ironic laughter, it seems as
though Lyotard is indicating the means by which he can make that prescription. That method is akin to the one that Westphal uses to demonstrate why there is no performative self-contradiction in the postmodern
claim that “the truth is that there is no Truth.”64 For Westphal, the answer
to this problem is to highlight the difference in capitalisation, and thereby
claim that when postmoderns assert the truth of their prohibition on Truth,
those words indicate two different things. In the latter case, it is a claim to
absolute certainty, but in the former, it is a mere description of what currently seems best to us given our finitude. In a parallel fashion, it seems
possible that what Lyotard is claiming is a provisional prescription against
absolute, certain prescriptions. That is what both the quotation and laughter
are alluding to.65 Similarly, Lyotard’s definition of the postmodern can also
be viewed in the same way. This is so because it exemplifies the core features of a metanarrative (universal, second-level, legitimating), and yet,
there is no contradiction if the definition is understood as merely a provisional rejection of metanarratives held absolutely.66
The upshot of this understanding is that two67 options then open up for
the Christian seeking a reconciliation with Lyotard. The first is to claim that
their Christianity is both provisional and only provisionally rejects other
absolute metanarratives.68 This position is consistent with Lyotard and
arguably theologically defensible, though to do so would require another
paper.69 The second option, however, makes such a requirement redundant
as it retains an absolute commitment to Christianity and yet still seeks a
détente with Lyotard. The nub of this second option is to recognise that
such a position does indeed conflict with Lyotard’s description of the postmodern. However, one does not stop there, but instead appeals to
Lyotard’s notion of the differend as a way to hold both Lyotard and
Christianity, if not in agreement, at least in coexistence. The Differend:
Phrases in Dispute is by his own estimation Lyotard’s most important work.
He wrote it whilst completing both The Postmodern Condition and Just
Gaming and in it he sets out his response to the problem of narrative conflict. He recognises that frequently narratives are in disagreement, and suggests that this occurs because there are no overarching grand narratives
that can equitably sort out the disputes. He asks what we should do in this
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circumstance, and his suggestion is that we “bear witness” to these differends, that is acknowledge and describe them, but not attempt to resolve
them. “What is at stake in a literature, in a philosophy, in a politics perhaps, is to bear witness to differends by finding idioms for them.”70 Indeed,
he goes further and suggests any forced attempt at resolution inevitably
unjustly silences one side or the other.71 In light of this, we can now return
to the conflict between an absolute commitment to Christianity and
Lyotard’s definition of the postmodern. It seems obvious that if the
Lyotardian is to remain faithful to Lyotard, she cannot preclude the
Christian narrative, both on the grounds of her merely provisional rejection of metanarratives and Lyotard’s acceptance of differends. Now, clearly, such a situation is not an agreement between Christianity and Lyotard,
but it is at least a coexistence. Therefore, whether one holds one’s
Christianity with absolute certainty or merely provisionally, either way
Lyotard’s definition of the postmodern does not necessarily exclude
Christianity.72
To conclude, if we are to be fair to Lyotard, we must accept that
Christianity is indeed a metanarrative. However, the solution to this problem is not to evade the point or to suggest that Lyotard has misunderstood
Christianity. Rather, it is to examine more closely Lyotard’s work, and,
paradoxically, by remaining more faithful to him, find the resources to situate both his thought and Christianity at least in the same room.
King’s College, London
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